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Abstract Previous studies on Japanese corporate governance were largely based on the
agency theory framework, and can be seen as attempts to understand the unique
monitoring mechanisms in the Japanese context. This paper briefly reviews prior
research and then discusses the recent changes in the environment that have been
affecting Japanese corporate governance. Our central argument is that there is both
change and continuity in Japanese Corporate Governance. We also present emerging
research from an institutional theory perspective. In this line of research, corporate
governance is treated as part of a nation’s institutional framework and hence, researchers
need to understand unique institutional arrangements that affect corporate governance
practices and their change or continuity.
Keywords Japan . Corporate governance . Institutional theory perspective
A large number of studies and commentaries regarding Japanese corporate governance
have been published, but they led to no clear consensus regarding its comparative
advantages, disadvantages, and continued persistence in the context of changing
economic and social contexts. Indeed, a cynical interpretation may be that evaluations of
Japanese corporate governance vary with the growth or decline of the Japanese
economy. For example, prior to 1990 when the Japanese economy was the envy of the
world, Japanese corporate governance, which was based on patient investors such as
affiliated firms and banks, was widely praised as one of the sources of the nation’s
competitive advantage (Porter, 1992). More recently, however, Japanese corporate
governance was blamed for Japan’s long economic recessions since the early 1990s
(Watanabe & Yamamoto, 1992). In order to understand corporate governance of
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Japanese firms, which is often seen as quite different from that of US firms, many
researchers examined its various aspects mainly from an agency theory perspective.
Agency theory posits that there are several monitoring mechanisms, such as the
external managerial labor market, performance-based compensation, the presence of
outside members on the board, and the market for corporate control, that are theorized to
control managerial behavior (Fama, 1980; Jensen, 1986). This perspective emphasizes
the primacy of financial performance and shareholder interests, and identifies these
mechanisms as means of narrowing the divergence of shareholder and managerial
interests. However, corporate governance systems differ in the priority given to the
interest of the primary corporate governance participants including shareholders,
creditors, and employees. As will be outlined later, the Japanese system is one in
which shareholder interests have not been dominant (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003;
Fukao, 1999). As a result, while there is some empirical evidence that some of these
mechanisms reduce agency problems in the US context, such mechanisms either do
not exist or, where they exist, do not function well in the Japanese context. Instead,
there have been different monitoring mechanisms in Japan more congruent with
Japanese norms and industrial organization. Thus, much research on Japanese
corporate governance has focused on such mechanisms as main bank monitoring,
keiretsu affiliation and block ownership. Prior research has attempted to examine the
effects of those mechanisms on such variables as firm strategies and performance.
However, both external and internal changes since the 1990s have been imposing
rising pressures on Japanese corporate governance to evolve and adapt to such changes.
In the context of the changing economic, social, and political context, therefore, we may
need to reassess the relevance of these stakeholders and focus on the emergence of other
stakeholders, especially more market-oriented investors. Further, the changing context is
posing a question as to whether Japan is in the process of institutional change. If so, then
it could have implications on the corporate governance system as it is part of the
institutional context. We aim to address those issues in this paper. Overall, our central
argument is that there is both change and continuity in Japanese corporate governance.
The objective of this paper is to review research on Japanese corporate governance
and present promising research directions. We view corporate governance as a dynamic
system that entails both change and continuity and also evolves over time. Japanese
corporate governance practices are deeply embedded in the Japanese business system
suggesting the existence of pressures toward continuity and persistence. Nevertheless,
corporate governance practices are evolving in the context of social, economic, and
political change. Thus, facing these opposing forces for change and continuity, Japanese
corporate governance is undergoing a process of path-dependent evolution. Hence, our
key research questions are: (1) What have been the key factors that are driving Japanese
corporate governance to change? (2) How and how much has Japanese corporate
governance changed? (3) More broadly, is the Japanese corporate governance system
converging to the US model?
Corporate governance system in Japan
Japanese corporate governance practices have typically been characterized by several
attributes: (1) the central role of banks and bankmonitoring; (2) ownership characterized
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by a network of stable and reciprocal shareholdings often among keiretsu members; and
(3) an insider dominated board (with a limited number of related outsiders) whose role
differs significantly from that of the US board. Tables 1, 2 and 3 outline the research
on Japanese corporate governance, some of which focus on major dimensions of the
postwar Japanese model such as the main bank and keiretsu monitoring, while others
deal with more recent developments such as the increasing effect of foreign investors.
As we can see from the table, a majority of research studied the existing or post-war
system of corporate governance.
Monitoring by the main bank
Along with the German system, Japanese corporate governance is often characterized as
a bank-centered system (Dore, 2000; Jackson & Moerke, 2005). The Japanese system
Table 1 Selected studies of Japanese main bank monitoring.
Authors and
publication year
Findings Implications Time period
of data
Prowse, 1990 Debt ratios of US firms are negatively
related risky sub-optimal investment,
while no such relationship is found
among Japanese firms
No evidence for agency
costs of debt among
Japanese firms
1984
Hoshi, Kashyap,
& Scharfstein, 1991
Support benefits of main bank
relations in terms of access to capital
and reduced relevance of liquidity
constraints on investments
Evidence of positive
implications of bank ties
Pre 1991
Weinstein
& Yafeh, 1995
Findings suggest that bank
influence leads keiretsu firms
toward overproduction, supporting
arguments that bank monitoring
promotes bank interests
Bank ties associated
with decisions which
benefit banks objectives
over firm objectives
1988
Weinstein
& Yafeh, 1998
Although bank ties increase
availability of capital when access
to capital markets is limited, the
cost of capital for firms with bank
ties higher than non-bank firms.
This result dissipates with financial
deregulation.
Evidence of weakening
strength of bank
monitoring
1977–1986
Morck
& Nakamura, 1999
Appointment of bank representatives
to the board associated with low
liquidity. Evidence of positive
monitoring effects of bank
appointments among bank affiliated
firms compared to independent firms
Bank representation on
boards associated with
monitoring primarily
among affiliated firms
1981–1987
Anderson
& Makhija, 1999
Bank debt positively associated with
growth opportunities, positive
market reaction to bank financing
announcement
Evidence for positive
market implications of
bank ties
Late 1980s
Arisawa
& Miyajima, 2005
Successful firms with strong bank
ties are much more likely to issue
public bonds than resort to bank
borrowing
Financially strong firms
seek non-bank financing
1996–2000
This table includes only selective journal articles
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Table 2 Selected studies on Japanese ownership structure.
Authors and
publication year
Findings Implications Time period
of data
Prowse, 1992 Higher ownership concentration
among Japanese firms compared
to US firms. Positive ownership
performance relationship among
independent firms compared to
keiretsu firms
Agency theory perspectives
most relevant to independent
firms
1984
Dow &
McGuire, 1999
Keiretsu firms exhibit more
dispersed ownership structure
than non-keiretsu and US firms
Close ties among keiretsu
owners reduce need for large
shareholdings
1987–1997
Morck et al.,
2000
Curvilinear relationship between
bank ownership and firm
performance. Corporate
blockholdings positively
associated with firm performance
Motives of bank and corporate
owners differ. Agency
formulations supported for
corporate blockholdings
1986
Ahmadjian &
Robbins, 2001
Negative relationship between
foreign ownership and local
embeddedness with acceptance
of downsizing
Agency formulations most
relevant to firms less subject
to local stakeholder pressures
1990–1997
Gedajlovic &
Shapiro, 2002
Positive relationship between
ownership concentration and
firm performance, evidence of
wealth transfer from more to
less profitable firms
Performance smoothing effects
of ownership concentration do
not support agency theory
formulations
1986–1991
Phan &
Yoshikawa,
2000
Foreign ownership and associated
with shareholder wealth
maximization
Foreign ownership pressures
promote investor orientation
1990’s
Yoshikawa &
Gedajlovic,
2002
Foreign ownership and foreign
listings are positively associated
with investor orientations, while
stable ownership and group
affiliation do not have any impact
Foreign ownership promotes
investor orientation
1999
Ahmadjian &
Robbins, 2005
Foreign ownership associated
with asset restructuring
Foreign ownership pressures
congruent with agency theory
formulations
1991–1998
Yoshikawa et al.,
2005
During the recessionary time,
domestic shareholdings associated
with wage intensity, while foreign
shareholdings associated with
reduced wage intensity
Monitoring role of foreign
investors congruent with
agency theory formulations
1998–2002
Gedajlovic,
Yoshikawa,
& Hashimoto,
2005
Given heterogeneity in the
investment preferences of
major classes of owners, the
relationship between ownership
and firm investment decisions
and capital structure depends
upon the identity of major owners
Interests of Japanese
institutional investors
heterogeneous
1996–1998
Seki, 2005 Evidence for declining cross-
shareholdings and growing
shareholder activism among
Japanese firms
Greater US corporate
governance pressures
during later time periods
1950–2003
Suto & Toshino,
2005
Based upon a survey of Japanese
institutional investors, findings
suggest that the forecasting time
horizon of institutional investors
Interests of Japanese
institutional investors
heterogeneous.
2003
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has usually been discussed around a main bank relationship, which is conventionally
defined as a long-term relationship between a firm and a bank from which the firm
borrows the largest share of its loans. The main bank relationship is not characterized
by bank loans alone, however, as main banks often hold shares in their client firms and
take care of the cash management accounts of these firms. Further, market participants
and government regulators perceive the role of the main bank as monitoring its client
firms and even intervene in the management of these firms if required (Aoki, Patrick,
& Sheard, 1994; Sheard, 1989). The combination of debt and equity ties between
banks and firms has been held to create a system which harmonizes the interests of
debt and equity holders, reducing the agency conflict between them. Due to their
multiple ties with the firm, it is argued that banks have incentives to work with
troubled firms (Aoki et al., 1994; Hoshi, 1994). Although the main bank system was
once praised as an effective system to promote long-term strategy of Japanese firms
(Porter, 1992), it has been under strain due to several factors as will be discussed later.
Table 1 provides a selected summary of this research
Table 2 (continued).
Authors and
publication year
Findings Implications Time period
of data
differs with institutional and
performance constraints
David et al.,
2006
Positive relationship between foreign
ownership and R&D and capital
intensity in the context of growth
opportunities
Foreign ownership effects
congruent with agency theory
formulations
1991–1997
Isobe et al.,
2006
Congruent with long-term perspective,
membership in horizontal keiretsu
associated with lower profitability,
but no evidence of risk sharing effects
No evidence of performance
smoothing effects
1977–2000
Italics indicates the articles published in APJM. This table includes only selective journal articles.
Table 3 Selected studies of Japanese board of directors.
Authors and
publication
year
Findings Implications Time period
of data
Yoshikawa &
Phan, 2003
Although outside directors’
involvement in strategic
decision-making was associated
with positive stock returns, adoption
of US board structure was not
related to firm performance
Limited support for performance
implications of adoption of US
board of director structures
2000
Aoki, 2004 No evidence for positive
relationship between board reform
and firm performance
No support for performance
implications of adoption of US
board of director structures
2002–2004
Miwa &
Ramseyer,
2005
Choice of outside board members
reflects resource dependencies. No
evidence of board composition-firm
performance relationship
Resource dependence role of
board, rather than agency
theory formulations supported
1986–1994
This table includes only selective journal articles.
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Ownership structure and keiretsu affiliation
Many Japanese firms are linked through extensive cross-shareholding arrangements
with their main banks, business partners, and client firms, and also a large portion of
Japanese stocks are owned by “stable” investors (Gerlach, 1992; Sheard, 1994a). It
is often argued that stable investors own shares primarily to cement and grow stable
business relationships rather than to earn a return on their stock investments
(Charkham, 1994; Kester, 1991). It is also suggested that they own shares in other
firms to ensure stability in earnings and sales so that they can protect the interests of
important stakeholders including employees, management, business partners that are
often members of the same keiretsu group (Caves & Uekusa, 1976; Nakatani, 1984).
Because of these characteristics, Japanese corporate governance is often seen as
stakeholder-oriented as opposed to shareholder-oriented (Buhner, Rasheed, Rosenstein,
& Yoshikawa, 1998; Weimer & Pape, 1999).
The differing objectives of Japanese equity owners lead to outcomes which differ
from agency theory formulations. In the US, large ownership blocks serve to monitor
the firm and promote shareholder interests. In contrast, several studies find
ownership concentration in Japan to be associated with greater mutual assistance
and monitoring (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002; Nakatani, 1984). Findings regarding
ownership concentration provide mixed findings on performance implications, with
some studies suggesting little ownership effects on firm performance (Prowse,
1992), positive effects (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002), and negative effects (McGuire
& Dow, 2003). Table 2 outlines selected studies on Japanese ownership structure.
As indicated in Table 2, other early studies compared keiretsu and independent firms
in terms of performance characteristics, often finding that affiliated firms exhibited
lower but perhaps more stable performance (e.g., McGuire and Dow, 2003; Nakatani,
1984; Prowse, 1992). More recent studies have expanded upon this research. For
example, Kim, Hoskisson, and Wan (2004) focus on the moderating role of strength of
keiretsu affiliation and compared the group monitoring effects between peripheral
members and core members. Studies making use of more recent data have also
challenged the traditional risk-reducing role of keiretsu membership. Isobe, Makino,
and Goerzen (2006) show that horizontal keiretsu membership does not enable
member firms to reduce risks through mutual assistance, which contradicts prior
studies. We will return to this issue when discussing the evolution of Japanese
corporate governance.
Board of directors
In Japan, as in many other countries, the board of directors is legally responsible for the
monitoring of management. However, the Japanese board has not traditionally defined
its primary role as that of monitoring top management (Gilson & Milhaupt, 2004;
Heftel, 1983). In part, this is because Japanese boards are often composed of mainly
executives, former employees, and only a small number of affiliated or related
outsiders (Kaplan & Minton, 1994; Sheard, 1994b). Since inside directors are viewed
as a representative of employees, researchers suggest that they lack incentives and
capability to monitor top executives to improve shareholder value (Kubo, 2005).
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However, there is a possible evolution in the board’s role in the context of changing
ownership pressures.
In analyzing the increasing role of (mostly related) outside board members, as
Table 3 suggests, two perspectives, resource dependence/networking and the agency
theory emphasis on monitoring, have informed research on the Japanese board.
Miwa and Ramseyer (2005) argue that firm characteristics determine board structure;
i.e., the appointment of outside directors is endogenous. Their study finds that firms’
appointments of outside directors are related to their external resource reliance. In
contrast, studies by Abe, Gaston, and Kubo (2005), Kaplan and Minton (1994), and
Morck and Nakamura (1999) suggest that directors appointed by banks play some
monitoring role. Hence, we have two perspectives on the board structure. In the
Japanese context of stable shareholdings and mutual support, however, these views
are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Pressures for change and responses
Weakening main bank system
One of the most significant changes in Japanese industrial organization has been a
decline in the role of bank financing. Spurred by regulatory changes which increased
access to non-bank debt in both domestic and foreign capital markets, reliance on bank
debt has gradually been declining since the 1980s (Fukao, 1999; Paker & Hodder,
2002). These regulatory changes were, in many respects, a response to growing
realization of higher cost implied by reliance on bank financing (Weinstein & Yafeh,
1995), which made use of non-bank financing particularly attractive in the context of
economic downturn during the 1990s. The availability of alternative sources of
financing made the costs of reliance on bank financing particularly relevant. The
increased relevance of the high costs incurred for bank support (which might be
viewed as a monitoring and insurance “premium”) led to increased questioning of
established practices.
These changes occurred at a time when banks were themselves facingmajor financial
crises. Spurred by significant amounts of non-performing loans, the banking industry
was faced with restructuring on an unprecedented scale (Morck & Yeung, 2006; Seki,
2005). Indeed, the 1990s was marked by bank failures and mergers which drastically
changed the banking landscape in Japan. This has important repercussions. First, bank
influence on industrial firms decreased, particularly in export industries and among
high growth sectors where flexibility and risk taking were particularly important
(Inoue, 1999; Morck & Yeung, 2006). Increased reliance on non-bank debt among
these firms can be traced not only to their greater access to such financing, but also to
the inconsistency between their strategic needs for innovation and risk-taking and bank
preference for low risk and tangible investments (Wu & Xu, 2005).
Second, reductions in debt financing were most prevalent among financially sound
firms (Arisawa & Miyajima, 2005; Suto & Toshino, 2005). Not only did this place
greater financial pressures on Japanese banks, but it created a situation in which
increasingly distressed banks were unwilling and/or unable to assist distressed firms or
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restructure their loan portfolios. Amid these changes, there are also firms, mostly those
without access to capital market financing, which maintain or even strengthen their
bank ties. Arisawa and Miyajima (2005) suggest that even among bank-linked firms,
financially strong firms made increasing use of non-bank debt. In general, Table 1
suggests increased recognition of the costs of reliance on bank financing, particularly
in the context of increased access to alternative financing and Japan’s continued
economic downturn. Thus, the traditional homogeneity of Japanese banking relations
began to unravel, with certain firm maintaining bank ties, others loosening them
(Arisawa & Miyajima, 2005; Inoue, 1999).
Rising capital market pressures
The ownership of Japanese firms has been dominated by domestic institutional and
corporate shareholders who are often long-standing business partners or keiretsu
member firms. However, changes in the capital markets have exerted pressures
toward evolution in this aspect as well. The prolonged Japanese economic downturn
and regulatory changes, which require Japanese firms and banks to report their
shareholdings in market value instead of book value, has had significant implications
for traditional stable shareholdings. According to data from the NLI Research
Institute (2004), stable shareholdings have dropped from 45 to 24%, and reciprocal
holdings dropped from 18 to 7% during the period 1990–2003. While a certain
percentage of these shares were redistributed to existing or new stable shareholders,
many were acquired by foreign and domestic arm’s-length investors. In particular
pension funds and investment trusts have gained increased prominence in the
Japanese market (Fukao, 1999; Inoue, 1999). In contrast to affiliated investors, these
market investors are more performance-oriented, particularly given regulation for
increased financial disclosure for pension funds (Suto & Toshino, 2005).
Another conspicuous capital market change facing Japanese firms since the 1990s is
the rise of foreign ownership. Since the mid-1990s, foreign ownership of Japanese firms
has been rising, climbing to 22% of all listed Japanese shares in March 2004.1 These
changes have had significant impact on not only performance expectations, but on
social and political pressures on corporate governance. Since these foreign investors
have only arm’s-length relationships with firms in which they own shares, they look
for higher investment returns and more shareholder-oriented corporate governance
model (Jackson & Moerke, 2005; Yoshikawa & Phan, 2001). Table 2 shows that
several studies have found a positive association between foreign ownership and firm
performance, which is congruent with the stronger performance orientation of foreign
owners (Miyajima & Kuroki, 2005; Nitta, 2000; Yoshikawa & Phan, 2003).
Table 2 also provides evidence that foreign ownership is creating pressures toward
more “US” style corporate governance practices—for example, investor relation
practices (Yoshikawa and Gedajlovic, 2002). David, Yoshikawa, Chari and Rasheed
(2006) examine the interaction effects of foreign ownership and growth opportunities
on R&D and capital investments and reveal that foreign investors promote such
investments primarily in firms with higher growth opportunities. In addition, foreign
1 Kabushiki Bunpu Chosa (Stock distribution survey), 2004.
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investors are more likely to demand Japanese firms to adopt global standards of
corporate information disclosure (Useem, 1998) since, unlike domestic affiliated
investors, they do not have other means to gather such information. Further, they may
pressure Japanese firms to restructure their operations during poor performance. In
fact, Ahmadjian and Robinson (2001) and Ahmadjian and Robbins (2005) find that
firms with larger foreign ownership are more likely to downsize by reducing the
number of employees and divest their assets during the 1990s. Similarly, Yoshikawa,
Phan, and David (2005) find that foreign ownership reduces employee wage payments
when firm performance is low. These findings suggest that foreign investors tend to
promote firm restructuring during poor performance.
As a result of these changes, Japanese firms are facing an increasingly heterogeneous
set of shareholder expectations (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, &Grossman, 2002; Thomsen
& Pedersen, 2000; Suto & Toshino, 2005). The interests of institutional investors can no
longer be considered homogeneous, with a sharp increase in the role of arm’s-length
institutional investors from foreign and domestic origins. Therefore, Japanese firms
have begun to face a different capital market environment. This changing equity
landscape also implies significant changes in the social and political pressures faced by
firms and government regulators. Investor activism has increased (Milhaupt, 2003; Seki,
2005). For example, the Japanese Pension Fund Association revised its principals of
fund management in 1999 to emphasize performance concerns (Seki, 2005).
Further evidence of the beginnings of a more fundamental change in the Japanese
approach to corporate governance is the increased role of political (in contrast to
regulatory) forces in proposing corporate governance change and the growing
prominence of non-profit corporate reform organizations. Various government agencies,
business associations, and investors groups have become active in attempting to
influence corporate governance practices and regulations. The 2002 corporate
governance reforms were, for example, championed by the Ministry of Justice, but
opposed by the Ministry of Finance and certain business associations. Indeed, Milhaupt
(2003) suggests a growing rate of corporate governance regulation resulting from
political and cultural changes permitting a more active regulatory role for a wide range
of actors: “...the market for production of corporate law became more competitive”
(p.23). These changes are significant in that they may suggest a more fundamental
change in the functioning of the Japanese business system. In addition to the changes
in investor pressures noted earlier, new social and regulatory forces have become
relevant to the evolution of Japanese corporate governance.
Responses to external pressures: Boardroom reform—what has changed
and what has not?
Efforts to reform the Japanese board of directors provide an excellent illustration of the
implications of these changes. The first such boardroom reformwas initiated by Sony in
1997. Sony reduced the number of board members from 38 to 10 and separated the role
of executive officers and directors. This practice has gradually been adopted by many
other Japanese firms. The separation of directors and executive officers often results in
the reduction of the board size since many directors are also executive officers in
Japanese firms. There are also firms that started to appoint more outside directors on
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their boards. The motives for these changes however are uncertain. One argument is that
firms adopted this practice in order to improve the quality of decision-making and the
effectiveness of managerial monitoring (Aoki, 2004). In other cases, outside board
appointments reflect monitoring by banks, parent firms, or government agencies.
However, this is still a major move for Japanese firms whose boards have been largely
reserved for internally promoted employees (Gilson & Milhaupt, 2004). Nevertheless,
the adoption of outside board members has not been that dramatic (Seki, 2005). For
example, the average number of outside directors among large Japanese firms was
only 0.6 out of the average total number of 10.5 directors in 2004. Even for those
firms appointing at least one outsider, the average number of outsiders was only 1.7.
There have also been reform measures at the legal level. In the existing system (an
auditor system), Japanese firms have the board of directors (torishimariyaku-kai) and
the board of statutory auditors (kansayaku-kai). While the board of statutory auditors
is in charge of monitoring the board, its effectiveness is often seen with skepticism
because those employees who did not excel enough to become a director are often
appointed as statutory auditors (Heftel, 1983). Hence, the system was criticized as
being inadequate to play an effective governance role. The most recent revision of
Commercial Code, which took effect in April 2003, represents a compromise between
the existing auditor system and the “US” system advocated by critics. It offers large
Japanese firms the choice between the auditor system and a committee system similar
to the system adopted by listed US firms. In this system, there is a clear legal
separation between monitoring and execution functions that had been practiced
informally by those firms which adopted the executive officer system initiated by
Sony. In addition to the legal separation of directors and executive officers, the board
of directors is required to have the three committees; i.e., nominating committee, audit
committee, and compensation committee. Although the definition of outsiders allows a
firm to appoint employees from affiliated firms, each committee consists of at least
three directors of which a majority of them must be outsiders. Adoption of the
committee system among Japanese firms has been very slow however; only 71 firms
(only 41 listed companies) adopted this in its first year (Gilson & Milhaupt, 2004) and
by 2004, less than 3% of listed firms had adopted it.
Despite the rising pressures from changing market context, we can argue that
Japanese corporate governance contains both change and continuity. Several reasons for
the slow pace of corporate governance change can be suggested. First, new stakeholder
expectations may have been insufficient to overcome traditional stakeholder pressures
and existing practices. Second, even in a more competitive regulatory marketplace,
traditional regulatory forces likely have greater weight than less well-established forces.
Regulatory reform does not occur in a vacuum. In the absence of parallel changes among
related and supporting aspects of the national business system (for example, disclosure
regulations, which facilitates outside monitoring), the impact of new stakeholder
pressures may be muted. This is consistent with the argument that institutional change is
often gradual and path dependent. We will discuss this issue further later.
Finally, the absence of clear evidence of the superiority of one corporate governance
model may also have slowed the diffusion of change. Since boardroom reforms in
Japanese firms started only in the late 1990s, there are not many empirical studies that
examine the performance implications of such reforms. Based on the limited existing
studies, the recent boardroom reforms initiated by Japanese firms do not appear to have
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had any positive effects on firm performance so far. Yoshikawa and Phan (2003)
examine the effects of outside directors, the separation of the board members and
executives officers, and the reduction of board size on firm performance. They found
that these reform measures had no impact on firm performance. Aoki (2004) also
investigates the effect of the executive officer system (informal separation of the board
members and executive officers) and found that such reform had no positive influence
on firm performance. Gilson and Milhaupt (2004) find that the announcement of the
adoption of the committee system did not lead to significant stock price movements.
Here again, there may be various reasons why these boardroom reforms at the
firm level had no impact on firm performance. First, although many firms claimed
that they had separated the role of directors and executive officers, these two
positions were sometimes held by the same individuals (Aoki, 2004). Hence, in
actual practice, the separation had not taken place in many firms. Further, the lack of
significant market movement in reaction to the adoption of the committee system
suggests that investors did not see such a move as a meaningful change (Gilson and
Milhaupt, 2004). This is perhaps due to the uncertain independence of outside
members (as they can include employees from affiliated or parent firms) or due to
lack of concurrent changes in other aspects of board processes (e.g., disclosure and
communication, frequency and conduct of meetings, etc.).2
Finally, it is important to consider the role of choice of corporate governance
mechanism. In view of the lack of clear evidence for the superiority of one corporate
governance model, the emphasis on choice served to legitimate both models. This
had important implications. First, choice of one or the other mechanism did not
“signal” good or poor firm performance or performance aspirations. Secondly,
choice of an appropriate board structure, particularly in the changing Japanese
context, likely involved balancing a number of possibly competing interests and
demands. Choice allowed firms to select the board structure most appropriate to their
particular set of stakeholder demands. Hence, investors may not have seen the new
system as superior and hence suitable to all firms.
Evolution of Japanese corporate governance as institutional change:
Convergence of corporate governance?
Many of the studies discussed in this review have attempted to address the agency
relationship in the Japanese institutional context in which some institution specific
factors such as the bank monitoring and keiretsu affiliation play an important role.
However, these studies also raise boarder theoretical issues. Whitley (1992) proposes
that corporate governance must be considered in the context of interrelated “national
business system.” From the perspective of institutional theory, corporate governance
can be treated as one aspect of the national business system, or the institutional
framework most relevant to the conduct of business. Corporate governance practices
are embedded in a local institutional environment and hence they have complemen-
tary relationships with other institutional elements (Aoki, 2001). For example,
2 In Asia, Japan is not alone in this regard. In China, Peng (2004) finds that outside directors do not
contribute to improvement of firms’ financial performance.
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Japanese corporate governance is complemented by employment and corporate
finance practices of Japanese firms as well as other supporting elements in the
system. Because of these complementarities corporate governance practices are
usually hard to change. Also, there are often forces that oppose to institutional
change because they have vested interests or see more benefits in the existing
system.
However, institutions do change from time to time. Corporate governance is part
of the institutional system and therefore, its changes need to be treated as
institutional change (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Yoshikawa, Tsui-Auch, & McGuire,
2007). As the institution evolves or develops, the existing practices may also need to
change as they are often not consistent with the emerging institutional context and
this gap may entail costs (Peng & Delios, 2006). According to institutional theory,
deinstitutionalization of established procedures stems from pressures on institution-
alized practices from functional, political, or social sources at both the firm and
environmental levels (Oliver, 1992). Pressures from one or all of these sources may
trigger institutional change.
In the Japanese context, there is a skeptical view that the shift to shareholder-
oriented corporate governance is desirable, as some believe that the competitive
advantage of Japanese firms lies in their employees’ commitment to their employer
firms and their firm specific skills and knowledge (Itami, 2000; Yoshimori, 2005).
For example, management of Toyota and Cannon claim that outside directors with
limited industry knowledge bring little benefits and that support for long-term
employment security enhances firm competitiveness. Further, there is no consensus
among the key players in Japan on the direction of corporate governance reform
(Gilson & Milhaupt, 2004). All these factors function to maintain continuity.
We noted in the previous section that Japanese corporate governance practices are
also facing rising pressures from multiple sources. Japanese firms are also under
greater market pressure to shift their corporate governance and to focus on
shareholders’ interests (Jackson & Moerke, 2005; Yoshikawa & Phan, 2001). These
pressures were reinforced by changes in public sentiments on corporate governance
practices after the collapse of stock prices in 1990 and continued poor performance
of many Japanese firms throughout the 1990s. During this period, there were
demands for greater transparency of corporate practices and more attention paid to
the interests of shareholders from various groups such as the stock market regulators
and some government agencies. These pressures facilitated the involvement of a
wider range of stakeholders and institutional actors (see Figure 1). Hence, we can see
forces for both change and continuity.
From this perspective, the evolution of corporate governance is more complex than a
simple convergence-divergence debate: whether corporate governance of non Anglo-
American countries including Japan is moving toward the shareholder-oriented
corporate governance model due to globalization of capital and product markets
(Bebchuck & Roe, 1999; Coffee, 1999; Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001). Organization
theorists generally do not support the argument that strong convergence is taking
place, but suggest that continuity and change often co-exist (Guillen, 2000; Jackson &
Moerke, 2005; Yeung, 2006; Yoshikawa et al., 2007). This is partly because local
stakeholder expectations will likely persist, and attention to the demands of global
investors may imply significant risk in terms of distancing the firm from its traditional
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network of local support (Matta & McGuire, 2006). Hence, the convergence debate
may be rather too simplistic, as it does not capture dynamic changes in corporate
governance in each institutional environment. Perhaps research issues that are more
pertinent and interesting include: (1) areas in which major changes have been taking
place, (2) the way those changes have been implemented at the institutional and firm
levels, and (3) directions of those changes.
Toward a comparative institutional theory of corporate governance change
Research tends to treat globalization of market forces, especially capital markets, as the
dominant force that push corporate governance practices of non-Anglo-American
countries toward the US models of corporate governance (e.g., Ahmadjian & Robbins,
2005; Seki, 2005; Yoshikawa & Gedajlovic, 2002). While many non-Anglo-American
countries started to implement some elements of the US models, there is still a wide
divergence in their corporate governance practices and models (Guillen, 2000). This is
partly because the degree of external pressures varies from a country to another.
Simply, some countries are more exposed to global market forces than others. But
also, each institutional context or country has its own internal players; some of them
may strongly resist any changes in corporate governance while others may accept
some elements of foreign models if they can modify those models to fit their own
institutional context. Further, each national context may vary in the extent to which
corporate governance practices are embedded and supported by other elements of the
institutional environment (Aoki, 2001). This suggests that changes in corporate
governance take place not only through the interactions between external and internal
Globalization of 
Capital Markets and 
Regulatory Changes 
Ownership Change 
• Foreign ownership 
• Stable ownership 
• Cross-holdings 
Capital Market 
Pressures 
Change in Institutional 
Expectations and 
Legitimacy 
Institutional 
Pressures 
Greater Adoption of 
Stockholder-Centered 
Corporate Governance 
Practices 
Figure 1 The Transition from stakeholder-centered to stockholder-centered corporate governance system
in Japanese firms (Figure modified from Yoshikawa & Phan 2001: 200)
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forces but also through the interactions among internal forces or players. Hence, if we
want to analyze how corporate governance practices are changing, it is critical that we
understand specific institutional contexts.
While these interactions strongly influence the institutional level changes, such
changes also affect how each firm can respond (or not respond) to external market
pressures (Peng, 2003). Within the boundaries of institutional and legal framework,
each firm has a choice as to how much it changes its practices facing those external
pressures. In other words, firms can decide how they form their own hybrid models
within the institutional boundaries in which they operate. Each firm has its own firm
specific characteristics, for example in terms of the exposure to external forces,
industry requirements, and inter-firm relations. Those firms that are more globally
exposed may be more willing to accept shareholder-oriented corporate governance
practices, while other firms that are more embedded in the domestic institutional
arrangements are more resistant to change (Gilson & Milhaupt, 2004). For example,
the evolution of corporate governance practices in Sony (Yoshikawa et al., 2007) and
Infosys (Khanna & Palepu, 2004) reflect firm-specific pressures and managerial
decisions. Therefore, the best practice may differ from one firm to another. This
suggests that there is a growing heterogeneity in corporate governance practices
among firms even within the same country (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Jackson &
Moerke, 2005). This heterogeneity or divergence of corporate governance practices
within the same institutional context is another area of research which is still
unexplored by researchers.
Future research directions
We have reviewed the existing Japanese corporate governance system and discussed the
main bank monitoring, the effects of ownership structure and group affiliation, and the
role of the board. We have also examined the impact of recent ownership changes,
especially rising foreign ownership, and corporate governance reforms. Many of these
studies attempted to investigate the performance and strategy implications of these
unique monitoring mechanisms in the Japanese context. Our discussion has highlighted
the significant institutional differences in Japanese and US corporate governance
practices, which imply different monitoring mechanisms such as main banks and group
membership in Japan.
We view this increasing recognition of these institutional differences as an important
foundation for future research. The growing recognition that context “matters” implies
that corporate governancemodels and researchmust become increasingly complex. One
important future direction is to expand the scope of corporate governance variables
examined, and interactions among these mechanisms. For example, despite some
promising initial steps, the role of some of the US corporate governance mechanisms
such as executive compensation in Japan has remained relatively unexplored (c.f.,
Kaplan, 1994; Kato, 1997; Kato & Kubo, 2006). Table 4 outlines some of this
emerging literature.
One reason for this relative lack of attention is the limited availability of detailed and
longitudinal data in Japan. As Japanese firms began to improve their disclosure,
however, there will be more future opportunities to examine this aspect. As Japanese
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corporate governance evolves and if it moves closer to the US models or implements
more elements of them, then executive compensation, along with other governance
variables such as outside directors, may become an increasingly important variable to
study. This implies that there is still large room to continue agency theory-based studies
in the Japanese context. As the scope of corporate governance mechanisms increases,
the interaction among corporate governance dimensions (e.g., compensation, owner-
ship, the board of directors) becomes critical, and will provide valuable insight into the
integration of “external” models into the Japanese system. The differences in
institutional context and the growing availability of data on a wider range of corporate
governancemechanism suggest several important areas for future research (See Table 5).
As globalization of capital and product markets will likely continue and impose
further pressures for change in corporate governance in various countries, studies
that look into national differences in institutional arrangements and responses from
key internal players, through the interactions among themselves, to the external
pressures will increasingly be an important research agenda. This is quite relevant
not only to the Japanese context but also to other national contexts that are in
institutional transition. Hence, along with the agency theory-based research, this
Table 4 Pay, incentives, management turnover, strategy.
Authors and
publication year
Findings Implications Time period
of data
Kaplan, 1994 While the pay-performance
sensitivities of compensation
of US and Japanese executives
were similar, Japanese
compensation more sensitive to
low earnings, and equity-based
compensation less significant
Although equity compensation
less prevalent, there are
similarities in pay-performance
sensitivity in Japanese and US
firms
1980
Kato, 1997 CEO’s of keiretsu firms earn
20–30% less than those of
independent firms
Lower pay among keiretsu CEO’s
may imply importance of other
rewards
1985
Kato & Kubo,
2006
Compensation more sensitive to
accounting performance than
stock market performance
Does not support investor
orientation in pay-performance
sensitivity
1986–1995
Abe et al., 2005 Negative relationship between
bank board membership and
incentive compensation
Possible trade-off between bank
monitoring and incentive
compensation
1989–1999
Kubo, 2005 Director compensation insensitive
to firm performance
Does not support monitoring role
or Japanese boards
1994–1995
Kang &
Shivadasni, 1995
Non-routine executive turnover
associated with return on assets,
stock returns and operating income,
but unrelated to industry
Evidence for monitoring role of
banks and large firms
1985–1990
Kang &
Shivdasani,
1997
Findings of fewer and less
significant downsizing among
Japanese firms compared to US
firms. Downsizing associated with
main bank and blockholder
ownership
Main bank and block
shareholdings associated with
shareholder orientation
1986–1990
This table includes only selective journal articles.
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theoretical line of studies provides great opportunities to investigate corporate
governance and its change in Japan as well as in other countries. Indeed, it may provide
important insights into the context under which alternative theoretical perspectives can
supplement or complement agency theory in understanding corporate governance.
Another future direction in corporate governance research is that of organizational
choice. Japanese regulatory reform (for example, the 2002 revision of the Japanese
Commercial Code) provides Japanese firms with the choices along several dimensions
of corporate governance. This provides researchers with an excellent opportunity to
examine not only the antecedents of corporate governance change, but their implications
as well. We have presented some recent changes in the Japanese context, especially
since the 1990s. As discussed, there have been growing pressures on Japanese firms and
Japanese model of corporate governance for change. This choice model implies the
coexistence of alternative models of corporate governance. This provides researchers
with an opportunity to expand beyond the traditional agency-based research model and
to examine corporate governance from the perspective of institutional theory. From this
perspective, corporate governance is treated as part of a nation’s institutional framework
and researchers need to attempt to understand unique institutional arrangements that
affects corporate governance practices. As a result, researchers should examine the
interdependence of various elements of the business system, for example the banking
sector, regulation, financial intermediation, and politics.
Table 5 Future research directions.
Research Areas Questions
Broader range of corporate
governance mechanisms
What is the role of executive compensation in Japanese corporate
governance?
To what extent does management turnover play a role in corporate
governance?
Has the market for corporate control become a more relevant factor in
Japanese corporate governance?
Is there evidence of “substitution effects” or do unique aspects of the
Japanese system serve as substitutes for US governance mechanisms?
Institutional context To what extent does the Japanese context imply differences in the role
of corporate governance mechanisms postulated in agency theory?
What are the interactions and interrelations among corporate
governance mechanisms in Japan?
What is the impact of regulatory and economic change on Japanese
corporate governance?
What are the implications of the increasing globalization of financial
markets for Japanese corporate governance?
To what extent are non-agency theory perspectives useful in
understanding corporate governance in different contexts?
To what extent is the Japanese experience relevant to understanding
other “bank-based” or “relation-based” governance systems in Asia
and elsewhere?
Organizational choice To what extent is there diversity (both in form and function) within
corporate governance regimes?
What is the role of institutional entrepreneurship in promoting
diversity and change in corporate governance?
What institutional forces (e.g., political, economic, cultural) play a
role in the evolution of corporate governance and organizational
responses to institutional pressures?
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